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__________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This dispute arises out of an automobile search after 
the driver was stopped for speeding.  This appeal, framed in the 
context of qualified immunity, addresses what characteristics can 
constitute reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an 
investigatory stop and a detention based on that stop.  Plaintiff 
George Karnes filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), alleging 
Pennsylvania State Troopers Thomas Skrutski and Edward Kowalski 
violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.0  Karnes appeals the district 
court's grant of qualified immunity in favor of defendants and 
its denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
 Karnes alleged three violations of the Fourth 
Amendment: (1) an investigatory stop made without reasonable 
suspicion; (2) an unconstitutionally lengthy detention; and (3) a 
search conducted without probable cause.  At trial, after the 
close of the evidence, the district court denied plaintiff's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law.  In ruling on defendants' 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court 
granted qualified immunity to Skrutski and Kowalski as to the 
existence of reasonable suspicion and the length of detention, 
                     
0The Fourth Amendment, as incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, applies to the conduct of state officials.  Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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but denied it on whether probable cause existed for the police to 
search Karnes's car.  The jury addressed this question through a 
special interrogatory, which it answered in defendants' favor, 
and the district court then granted qualified immunity to the 
police regarding probable cause for the search.  Karnes appeals. 
We will reverse in part and affirm in part. 
I. 
A. 
 On October 26, 1990, George Karnes was driving his car 
west on Interstate 78 toward Duncannon, Pennsylvania.  At about 
5:00 p.m., defendant Skrutski, a Pennsylvania State Police 
Trooper, stopped Karnes for violating the speed limit.  It is 
undisputed Karnes was speeding and that Skrutski stopped Karnes 
only because he was speeding.  At the time of the stop Skrutski 
had no reason to suspect Karnes of any illegal activity. 
 After stopping Karnes, Skrutski requested that a Canine 
Drug Enforcement Unit be sent to assist him.  Karnes contends 
Skrutski requested the canine unit at 5:00 p.m., immediately 
after stopping him, while Skrutski claims he requested the unit 
at 5:15 p.m. after observing many factors which made him suspect 
Karnes was transporting drugs.  While waiting for the dog to 
arrive, Skrutski asked to search Karnes's camera bag, film 
canister, and a manila envelope.  Karnes consented to these 
searches which revealed no contraband.  Karnes refused to consent 
to further searches of his luggage and car. 
 Defendant Edward Kowalski arrived with a dog trained in 
narcotics detection at approximately 5:30 p.m.  Between then and 
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7:00 p.m., the officers repeatedly requested Karnes's consent to 
search the car, but Karnes refused.  Ultimately, the police used 
the dog to sniff the exterior of Karnes's car, and it jumped 
through the open driver's side window twice.  The two troopers 
then searched the interior and trunk of Karnes's car.  Their 
search uncovered nothing illegal, and they released Karnes at 
approximately 7:30 p.m., after issuing a citation for speeding. 
 Karnes contends that defendants lacked reasonable 
suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment to convert the routine 
traffic stop into a detention for investigation of drugs, and 
that even if reasonable suspicion were present, his detention for 
nearly two and one-half hours exceeded the scope of a seizure 
based on less than probable cause.  Karnes also claims the search 
of his car was unlawful as the police lacked probable cause. 
 Defendants maintain the use of the dog did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment because they had reasonable suspicion to 
detain Karnes beyond the scope of an ordinary traffic stop in 
order to investigate whether he was transporting drugs.  The 
length of detention, they assert, was due to Karnes's 
argumentative questioning of their procedures.  Further, 
defendants assert the dog signalled the possible presence of 
drugs by jumping in the open window of Karnes's car, thus 
providing probable cause for them to conduct a full search. 
 Defendants contend Skrutski observed indicators of 
possible drug activity that provided reasonable suspicion to call 
for the dog: (1) Karnes's car was a blue mid-sized Honda Accord; 
(2) the car had high mileage for its age (145,000 miles over a 
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three-year period); (3) the car had a two-way citizens band 
radio; (4) the car had a radar detector; (5) the car had an 
antenna on the trunk, possibly for a car phone; (6) the car had 
Florida license plates and registration; (7) Karnes had maps in 
his car, one of which was open to New York City, specifically the 
Bronx, allegedly a center for the illegal drug trade; (8) Karnes 
was travelling on an interstate highway to the Harrisburg area, 
also allegedly a regional center for drug trafficking; (9) Karnes 
gave Skrutski permission to search a camera bag and manila 
envelope but refused to consent to further searching; (10) 
Skrutski noticed brown and green "vegetable matter," which he 
suspected was marijuana, ranging in size from dust to an inch in 
diameter on the rear floor of plaintiff's vehicle (in fact the 
"vegetable matter" was ordinary tree leaves); (11) Skrutski 
observed that Karnes was nervous and evaded questions; and (12) 
Skrutski thought that Karnes's limited baggage was inconsistent 
with his assertion he had been travelling a long time and that 
his casual attire belied his assertion he was returning from a 
business engagement earlier that day.  Defendants further state 
that after Kowalski arrived with the dog they observed other 
factors: (1) Karnes requested to drive off of the highway to a 
rest stop to use the rest room; (2) they saw fast-food wrappers 
in the car; (3) Karnes demonstrated knowledge of drug 
interdiction programs. 
 Karnes denies the presence of many of these factors, 
and argues defendants asked for and received explanations for the 
remainder.  Karnes denies the car had a car phone antenna, that 
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the maps he had were open to the Bronx, and that he was nervous. 
Karnes explained to the police that he bought the car used with 
high mileage on it and that he drove a great deal for his work 
installing computer systems.  He explained his company was 
headquartered in Florida and gave the troopers a business card 
for them to verify the information.  Karnes told them the 
"vegetable matter" was leaves from a recent camping trip and that 
his casual attire was what he normally wore on his job.  Karnes 
admits he asked to go to the nearest exit to use a rest room to 
urinate but also states that he ultimately requested simply to be 
allowed to use the nearby woods.  He contends the troopers 
refused his request unless he would consent to a search of his 
car.   
B. 
 Karnes states that the defendants were purportedly 
using indicators established by the Pennsylvania State Police 
Department's Operation Whiteline, a program designed to train 
officers in evaluating conduct which otherwise might be 
considered innocent, but which in fact is an effort to disguise 
drug trafficking.  Karnes contends that many of the factors 
Skrutski purported to rely upon were personally developed 
indicators which are not found in official Operation Whiteline 
lists, and that many of the factors the defendants developed 
contradict the Whiteline factors.  In any case, Karnes argues the 
innocence of each factor.  
 We have previously noted that the use of indicators or 
drug courier profiles has been sharply challenged, especially 
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when the profiles "include constitutionally-relevant factors, 
such as membership in certain racial groups, or neutral factors 
arguably unrelated to drug trafficking, such as wearing 
disheveled clothing or looking 'different.'"  United States v. 
Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 655 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993).  Neither in 
Coggins nor elsewhere have we specifically analyzed the impact 
drug courier profiles or indicators may have on courts' Fourth 
Amendment analysis. 
 Whether courts should give weight to the fact that a 
person searched met the characteristics of a drug courier profile 
is not a question we need to decide in this case.0  Defendants 
                     
0The Supreme Court recently responded to a defendant's claim that 
use of a profile served to undermine the government's reliance on 
the facts it presented to prove reasonable suspicion by noting 
that "the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' 
does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as 
seen by a trained agent."  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 
10 (1989) (emphasis added).  The Court gave no indication that 
the profile would enhance the significance of these facts, and 
thus Sokolow suggests that "the drug courier profile has little 
meaning independent of the objective facts" presented by the law 
enforcement officer as sufficient to demonstrate reasonable 
suspicion.  United States v. O'Neal, 17 F.3d 239, 242 n.5 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 418 (1994).  In other words, 
while the factors the law enforcement officer uses to demonstrate 
that the profile is met can support a finding of reasonable 
suspicion, the profile as such does not provide any additional 
support for such a finding.  
 
 The drug courier profile here, which defendants have 
not demonstrated to be empirically valid, thus serves as no more 
than an investigative tool for law enforcement officers.  See 
United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 600 & n.21 (5th Cir. Unit B 
1982) (en banc) (rejecting use of profiles without examination of 
the totality of circumstances, but recognizing the utility of the 
profile as a guide to help law enforcement officers determine 
which individuals merit closer attention).  The profile cannot, 
without more, serve as a method by which innocent factors can be 
lifted by their own bootstraps somehow to become suspicious.  Cf. 
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 
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relied on numerous factors which are not part of the Operation 
Whiteline profile, and they do not allege the stop of Karnes was 
justified by the profile alone.  Indeed, the defendants stated: 
 
Indicators on which an officer may rely may 
be contained in the Operation Whiteline 
booklet, and may be developed by the troopers 
themselves based upon local information and 
things observed in their experience.  It is 
not possible to list all of the indicators in 
a single source document because they are 
dynamic and continuously changing as drug 
traffickers change their procedures. 
Appellees' Br. at 7 (citations omitted).  The defendants' 
reliance on the Operation Whiteline profile was thus so 
attenuated as to make the profile in this case irrelevant to our 
determination of reasonable suspicion.  Our analysis will look 
instead at the objective facts which defendants claim constitute 
reasonable suspicion.  See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417-18 (1981) (holding that reasonable suspicion requires a 
"particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity"). 
II. 
                                                                  
1971) (accepting the validity of an anti-hijacker profile 
compiled through rigorous and careful scientific analysis, but 
rejecting its use when one criterion was eliminated and two added 
without proof that the alterations were similarly valid).  We 
think it appropriate to expect that the government prove that "an 
identifiable profile exist[s], that it consist[s] of specific 
elements which accurately identif[y] criminals, and that the 
[plaintiff] conformed to it," before expecting acceptance of the 
profile as an element in the totality of the circumstances test. 
See Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug 
Courier Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 
B.U. L. Rev. 843, 853-54 (1985). 
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 Our review of the district court's grant of a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law is plenary, and we apply the same 
test for granting or denying it as did the district court. 
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 
1993).  In a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we review 
the facts from the perspective most favorable to the nonmovant. 
Id.  The determination of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment is a question of law that we review de novo.  United 
States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992).  The district court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). 
III. 
 Karnes's prima facie case under § 1983 requires that he 
prove he suffered a violation of rights created by federal law, 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985), at the hands 
of a person acting under color of state or territorial law, Gomez 
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).  The defendants raised the 
affirmative defense of qualified immunity, id., which absolves 
defendants if reasonable officers could have believed their 
conduct was lawful "in light of clearly established law and the 
information the searching officers possessed," Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).  This qualified immunity 
inquiry is an objective, fact-specific pursuit.  Id.; see also 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).  Defendants bear the 
burden of establishing the affirmative defense of qualified 
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immunity.  Ryan v. Burlington County, N.J., 860 F.2d 1199, 1204 
n.9 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989). 
 The district court granted in part defendants' motion 
for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence, and 
we must therefore consider whether the evidence, presented in a 
light most favorable to Karnes together with all reasonable 
inferences on his behalf, could support a reasonable jury's 
verdict in his favor.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 
F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  While the qualified immunity 
defense is frequently determined by courts as a matter of law, a 
jury should decide disputed factual issues relevant to that 
determination.  Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 
185, 190-92 (3d Cir. 1984); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 
201 (3d Cir. 1993); White v. Walker, 950 F.2d 972, 976 (5th Cir. 
1991); see also Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649 (2d Cir. 
1994) (holding that while qualified immunity should normally be 
decided by the court, where facts concerning the availability of 
the defense are disputed "jury consideration is normally 
required"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995). 
 The district court applied the qualified immunity 
inquiry separately to each of the three steps of the search.  The 
court first addressed whether the defendants had reasonable 
suspicion to turn the routine traffic stop into an investigative 
stop, then whether the length of the detention was reasonable for 
an investigative stop, and finally whether the results of the 
investigative stop provided them with probable cause to conduct a 
search of the car.    
12 
 The initial stop passes constitutional muster because 
Karnes was speeding.  United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 
1092 (3d Cir. 1990).  But it is clear that Karnes has presented 
sufficient evidence to present a prima facie case that his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated by the subsequent investigative 
stop, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), 
detention, see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983), 
and search, see United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 343 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 415 (1992).  Accordingly, 
defendants can only prevail as a matter of law if they are 
shielded by qualified immunity. 
A. 
 Karnes claims the police did not have reasonable 
suspicion to conduct an investigative stop after pulling him over 
for violating the speed limit.  He correctly observes that the 
police needed a separate justification to detain him beyond the 
time necessary to issue a citation for speeding, Berkemer, 468 
U.S. at 439, and he contends that such justification was lacking. 
 In order to analyze defendants' claim of qualified 
immunity on whether there was reasonable suspicion, we must 
determine whether the law was clearly established at the time of 
the alleged violation, and we must also decide whether, given the 
law at that time, a reasonable officer could have believed the 
conduct to have been reasonable.  See Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 
13 
1456 (10th Cir. 1991).0  The first part of this test is purely a 
question of law, but the latter part of the test requires 
                     
0Karnes presents a preliminary argument that qualified immunity 
cannot apply in this instance because it would create a logical 
inconsistency.  He argues:  
 
If the plaintiff proved defendants did not 
act as would a reasonable officer under the 
circumstances, it would be impossible for 
defendants to be immune on the ground that 
the same reasonable officer would believe the 
defendants' actions were constitutional. 
Where the law is clearly established and 
proof of the elements of the plaintiff's 
prima facie case would defeat the immunity, 
no qualified immunity defense is available. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 36.  This argument has superficial appeal but 
in fact misconstrues the nature of qualified immunity, and in any 
case has been rejected by the Supreme Court. 
 
 In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987), the 
plaintiffs argued that "it is inappropriate to give officials 
alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment--and thus 
necessarily to have unreasonably searched or seized--the 
protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect 
reasonable official action.  It is not possible, that is, to say 
that one 'reasonably' acted unreasonably."  The Court rejected 
this argument.  The Court's response was that qualified immunity 
seeks to measure whether the officer was reasonable in his 
understanding (albeit mistaken) of what was lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 643-44.  There is no conflict in saying 
a police officer who acted unreasonably nevertheless reasonably 
(but mistakenly) believed his conduct was reasonable. 
 
 Karnes cites Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490 (3d Cir. 
1993), and Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185 
(3d Cir. 1984), to support this argument.  Deary, however, was 
decided before Anderson, and therefore is supplanted by the 
Supreme Court's subsequent determination of the question.  Lippay 
is not apposite because it was a case where to prevail plaintiff 
had to demonstrate the officer submitted an affidavit containing 
statements he knew to be false or about which he was reckless as 
to their falsity.  Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1504.  Lippay provides an 
example of cases where proof of the Fourth Amendment violation 
necessarily proves a lack of reasonableness as to the existence 
of that violation, a situation very different from the one facing 
Karnes here. 
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application of the law to the particular conduct at issue, an 
inquiry which may require factual determinations if the nature of 
the conduct is disputed.  Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 
(4th Cir. 1992). 
1. 
 Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a 
matter of law if the applicable law was not clearly established 
at the time of the alleged constitutional violation.  Anderson, 
483 U.S. at 640.  The level of abstraction at which the 
plaintiff's rights are articulated is of considerable importance. 
Id. at 639.  The Supreme Court has stated,  
 
The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right.  This is not to say that 
an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question 
has previously been held unlawful; but it is 
to say that in the light of pre-existing law 
the unlawfulness must be apparent. 
Id. at 640 (citation omitted).  Obviously, the law was 
established in 1990 that searches or seizures in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment would violate Karnes's rights, but there was no 
case directly on point with circumstances identical to those 
facing Skrutski and Kowalski.  The right Karnes seeks to 
vindicate is the right to be free from investigative stops unless 
reasonable suspicion is present.  
 All parties agree, and we concur, that until defendants 
actually searched Karnes's car the stop was in the nature of a 
"Terry" stop for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  In Terry v. 
15 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), the Supreme Court held that certain 
investigative stops by police officers were permissible without 
probable cause, as long as "in justifying the particular 
intrusion [into Fourth Amendment rights] the police officer [is] 
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion."  See also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 
("[T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called 
'Terry stop' than to a formal arrest."  (Citation omitted)).0 
 The Supreme Court had refined the Terry standard prior 
to 1990, holding the types of articulable facts that can provide 
reasonable suspicion cannot include "circumstances [which] 
describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, 
who would be subject to virtually random seizures" were the 
circumstances accepted as reasons for the investigation.  Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam).  By contrast, in 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989), the Court, after 
considering the factors presented, stated that "[a]ny one of 
these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and 
is quite consistent with innocent travel.  But we think taken 
together they amount to reasonable suspicion." 
                     
0We note that in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979), 
the Court observed that a Terry stop must be limited in duration, 
and that a more lengthy detention "must be based on consent or 
probable cause."  (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975)).  The stop here was not really the 
typical traffic stop, which is usually very brief.  We treat the 
length of detention issue below in part III.B. 
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 Reid and Sokolow are in apparent tension with each 
other with respect to the ability to use circumstances or factors 
that appear innocent to find reasonable suspicion.  The tension 
disappears, however, when the facts of the two cases are 
compared.0  In Reid, the defendant was observed moving through an 
airport concourse within several yards of another man who was 
carrying a shoulder bag identical to defendant's.  448 U.S. at 
439.  The defendant occasionally looked backward in the direction 
of the second man.  Id.  A DEA agent approached the defendant, 
who was at that point standing outside with the other man.  The 
agent requested their airline ticket stubs and identification, 
which they supplied.  The tickets indicated they had stayed in 
Fort Lauderdale for just one day.  The two men consented to a 
search, which uncovered cocaine.  Id.  The observed actions of 
the two men, the Court concluded, were not enough to present 
reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity. 
Id. at 441. 
 In Sokolow, the defendant was stopped at Honolulu 
Airport by DEA agents, who found a large amount of cocaine in his 
carry-on luggage.  490 U.S. at 3.  In contrast to Reid, the DEA 
agents had the following information before approaching the 
defendant:  
 
(1) he paid $2,100 for two airplane tickets 
from a roll of $20 bills; (2) he traveled 
under a name that did not match the name 
                     
0The inquiry into the existence of reasonable suspicion is fact-
specific.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (observing 
the protean quality of police encounters with individuals).  
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under which his telephone number was listed; 
(3) his original destination was Miami, a 
source city for illicit drugs; (4) he stayed 
in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a 
round-trip flight from Honolulu to Miami 
takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous 
during his trip; and (6) he checked none of 
his luggage. 
490 U.S. at 3.  In Sokolow, the Court observed the necessity of 
considering "the totality of the circumstances" in order to 
evaluate the existence of reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 8.  The 
Court apparently attached particular significance to defendant's 
payment in cash, to the length of his trip, and to the agents' 
reasonable belief that he was traveling under an alias.  Id. at 
8-9.  The Court focused on factors which it perceived as "out of 
the ordinary."  Id. at 8.  Reid and Sokolow, taken together, 
demonstrate it is not enough that law enforcement officials can 
articulate reasons why they stopped someone if those reasons are 
not probative of behavior in which few innocent people would 
engage--the factors together must serve to eliminate a 
substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement 
of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied.  This is a totality of 
the circumstances test.  United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 
1370 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 Reid and Sokolow were decided before the events in this 
case.  Together, they provide sufficient guidance to reasonable 
officers to make clear that detaining Karnes would only be 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment if they had reasonable 
suspicion and to show the requirements of the reasonable 
18 
suspicion standard.  We hold the law was clearly established for 
purposes of qualified immunity. 
2. 
 Since the law was clear at the time of the alleged 
violation, defendants can be granted qualified immunity only if 
their conduct in detaining Karnes, even if in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, was a violation a reasonable officer could have 
committed.  We must determine the propriety of the district 
court's grant of judgment as a matter of law "in part by 
analyzing the evidence adduced by plaintiff as to the conduct of 
the defendants."  Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991).  We are seeking 
to determine whether a sufficient dispute about a material fact 
exists "to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."  Id. 
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).   
 The standard for granting or denying a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law does not change in the qualified 
immunity context.  Cf. Pritchett, 973 F.3d at 313 (observing the 
summary judgment inquiry does not change in the qualified 
immunity context).  Karnes will prevail on this issue if "a 
reasonable jury could find that the unlawfulness of their actions 
was so 'apparent' that no reasonable [police officers] could have 
believed [their] actions were lawful."  Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 
66, 69 (3d Cir. 1988).0 
                     
0The issue in Lee arose in the context of a motion for summary 
judgment rather than a motion for judgment as a matter of law. We 
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 The district court held there were sufficient 
undisputed facts known by the defendants to provide them with 
reasonable suspicion to detain Karnes: (1) Karnes drove a blue, 
mid-sized Honda; (2) the car had high mileage for its age; (3) 
the car had a citizens band radio and radar detector; (4) the car 
was licensed and registered in Florida; (5) Karnes had a Florida 
license with a Florida address; (6) Karnes was driving on an 
interstate highway; (7) the car contained numerous maps, 
including one open to the Bronx; (8) Karnes consented to the 
search of certain items but then refused further consent; (9) 
Karnes requested to go to the rest room; (10) Karnes showed 
knowledge of drug interdiction programs; (11) the car contained 
fast-food wrappers; (12) the car contained brown and green 
"vegetable matter" of various sizes.  Tr. of Civil Jury Trial at 
5-156 to 5-157 (May 17, 1994).  The district court further 
observed: 
 
The Plaintiff's mood changed.  The Plaintiff 
was extremely nervous.  That Plaintiff's car 
had a car phone antenna.  Defendant Skrutski 
testified that Plaintiff's luggage and attire 
were inconsistent with Plaintiff's statements 
[concerning] the length and purpose of his 
trip.  Defendant Skrutski also testified to 
difficulty in obtaining the results of the 
license and registration check.  Plaintiff 
himself stated that his license tags had been 
previously transferred to his car and that on 
a previous occasion an officer had difficulty 
obtaining details. 
                                                                  
have made clear, however, that "the standard for granting summary 
judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict." Rotondo v. 
Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 442 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotations 
omitted). 
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Id. at 5-158. 
 Karnes contends the district court erred in finding 
reasonable suspicion present and in holding that all of these 
factors were indisputably present.  We agree.  We cannot agree 
with the district court's finding that all the factors it listed 
were undisputed.  Viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could believe that only certain 
factors were present, and that Karnes's mood did not change, he 
was not nervous, he had proper luggage and attire, there was no 
car phone antenna, and the maps were not open to the Bronx.  We 
find the factors here insufficient as a matter of law to provide 
reasonable suspicion for defendants to have detained Karnes 
beyond the point needed to issue the speeding citation, and that 
there was no objectively reasonable basis for defendants to have 
believed they did have reasonable suspicion.   
 Aside from the "vegetable matter," the factors listed 
by the court did not provide any basis for the police to 
distinguish Karnes from the vast majority of innocent drivers on 
our interstate highways.  We are cognizant that under the 
totality test it is possible that "objective facts, meaningless 
to the untrained," can provide the basis for reasonable 
suspicion.  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981). 
But the Fourth Amendment does not allow random searches of 
persons travelling the nation's highways.  The factors the 
district court listed, like those to which the police testified, 
are simply too ordinary--too much like the factors in Reid and 
not enough like those in Sokolow.  As we noted above, reasonable 
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suspicion cannot include "circumstances [which] describe a very 
large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would [then] 
be subject to virtually random seizures."  Reid, 448 U.S. at 441. 
 The test for reasonable suspicion is a totality of the 
circumstances inquiry.  Although we do not analyze each factor in 
isolation, we will describe these factors separately in order to 
explain why they were insufficient in the aggregate.   
 Karnes was the Northeast Field Engineer for Financial 
Securities Information Systems, and his principal responsibility 
was the installation of computer systems throughout the Eastern 
seaboard.  Karnes bought his car used with 80,000 miles on it, a 
fact he had explained to defendants.  In any case, high mileage 
on a car is not by itself suspicious, nor is the presence of maps 
in a car.  Clearly many people innocent of any wrongdoing will 
have cars with high mileage on them, and maps (whether or not 
open to the Bronx) are also used by huge numbers of innocent 
people. 
 Defendants argue "that mid to full size cars and cars 
which are average looking or common and which easily blend in 
with traffic are frequently used to transport drugs."  Appellee's 
Br. at 4.  This argument seeks to turn the central notion of 
reasonable suspicion on its head.  Reasonable suspicion cannot be 
based on a factor that makes the person searched look more like 
an ordinary, innocent person; there must be reliance on factors 
that provide reason to suspect criminal behavior.  Were we to 
accept this argument, we would be granting permission to conduct 
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investigatory stops of people deemed "suspiciously normal."  The 
Fourth Amendment forbids granting such permission. 
 Karnes's car contained a citizens band radio and a 
radar detector.  The presence of these communications devices 
alone does not support reasonable suspicion.  See United States 
v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).  Drug 
couriers may use these items, but they are devices used primarily 
by people innocent of any illegal activity and alone create no 
suspicion of criminal activity. 
 The district court found it significant that the car's 
license and registration were from Florida because Florida is a 
"known drug center."  Other courts have held that out-of-state 
plates are consistent with innocent behavior and not probative of 
reasonable suspicion.  See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 
1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2015 (1995); 
Tapia, 912 F.2d at 1371.  Florida is not the only "known drug 
center," and the mere fact that Karnes was from Florida cannot be 
a factor supporting reasonable suspicion.0  Presumably the vast 
bulk of people with cars registered in Florida are not drug 
smugglers, and they have a right to travel to Pennsylvania.0 
                     
0The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed that drug 
enforcement agents might label almost any city in the country as 
a major narcotics distribution center.  United States v. Andrews, 
600 F.2d 563, 566-67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 
(1979). 
0We do not suggest that geography is an irrelevant factor for 
this totality of the circumstances test.  Certainly in United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989), it was relevant that the 
defendant was travelling to and from Miami since Miami was "a 
source city for illicit drugs."  But the entire state of Florida 
cannot properly be termed a source of illicit drugs, and the mere 
23 
 The fact that Karnes granted consent to Skrutski to 
search some items and then refused to give consent to additional 
searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion. 
Karnes's right to refuse to consent falls within the Fourth 
Amendment's core protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Karnes's exercise of that right cannot be penalized by 
adding his refusal to consent as a factor in this inquiry, even 
if, as defendants testified, Karnes became argumentative and 
difficult.   
 We have no reason to doubt defendants' assertion that 
drug couriers on occasion will request to go to the rest room, 
hoping thereby to gain an advantage or to dispose of illegal 
drugs.0  But both parties agree Karnes requested to go to the 
rest room only after the police decided to use the drug dog to 
inspect his car.  We need not decide whether a request to go to 
the rest room could provide reasonable suspicion in other 
circumstances because it could not have here: Karnes's request 
came after the point when the police were required to have 
                                                                  
fact that Karnes' car was registered and licensed in Florida is 
an extremely weak factor, at best. 
0Kowalski explained: 
 
And to me the training I've had is, drug 
couriers, when they're stopped by the police, 
sometimes they have back up people following 
them.  And what we were taught is, not to let 
them go off the interchange.  Because what 
the general rule is, among the couriers, is 
to go off the next interchange . . . [or] 
rest area.  That's where the -- person that 
is escorting you will meet you.  So, it's for 
the safety of the police officer . . . . 
 
App. at 536-37.   
24 
reasonable suspicion.  Most innocent people who have traveled for 
any length of time will, of course, make a similar request out of 
physiological necessity.  We intimate no view as to whether such 
a request would be suspicious in some contexts, but it is not 
suspicious here. 
 The penultimate factors relied upon by the troopers 
were Karnes's knowledge of drug interdiction programs and the 
presence of fast-food wrappers in his car.  The latter have 
become ubiquitous in modern interstate travel and do not serve to 
separate the suspicious from the innocent traveler.  Nor do we 
understand how mere knowledge of interdiction programs can be 
suspicious.  Indeed, Karnes's display of such knowledge seems 
counterintuitive--if Karnes was trying to hide the presence of 
drugs he would scarcely announce his knowledge of drug 
trafficking and interdiction procedures.  Karnes announced to the 
police that he had gleaned his knowledge of the procedures from 
having watched a television program.  In any case, too much of 
the knowledge he displayed is in the public domain (and is well-
publicized by popular television programs) for it to provide a 
basis for suspicion. 
 The last factor is the presence of green and brown 
"vegetable matter" on the floor of Karnes's car.  Defendants 
claim these leaves appeared to be marijuana, thus creating 
reasonable suspicion that Karnes was transporting drugs.  Karnes 
claims these were leaves from a recent camping trip, and that 
"[t]here wasn't just a little bit of leaves, there were leaves 
everywhere in there."  App. at 189-90.  Karnes also testified 
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that "[a]t one point Kowalski mentioned the leaves.  And he said 
that he knew that they weren't marijuana, but that he was going 
to use them as probable cause to search my car."  Id. at 190.  We 
review the evidence upon which the district court relied in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.  In that posture it is 
clear the jury could reasonably find the police did not really 
believe the leaves were marijuana and that they had no reasonable 
basis for so believing.  Thus, the leaves do not support the 
existence of reasonable suspicion, at least for our review of the 
district court's grant of defendants' motion for judgment as a 
matter of law on qualified immunity. 
 All of these factors, both individually and 
collectively, were insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion 
that Karnes was not an innocent traveler.  It is possible for 
factors, although insufficient individually, to add up to 
reasonable suspicion--that is the nature of a totality of the 
circumstances test.  But we think it impossible for a combination 
of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious 
conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an 
interpretation.  We hold that defendants have not demonstrated 
the existence of sufficient undisputed facts for us to hold that 
they had reasonable suspicion to detain Karnes beyond the scope 
of the traffic stop or that a reasonable officer could have been 
reasonable but mistaken in the belief that reasonable suspicion 
existed.  In sum, the defendants cannot receive qualified 
immunity on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.  A 
reasonable jury could resolve the disputed issues of fact in 
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plaintiff's favor, in which case defendants would lack an 
objectively reasonable basis for believing reasonable suspicion 
was present to detain Karnes. 
B. 
 The district court also held defendants were entitled 
to qualified immunity on the defendants' motion for judgment as a 
matter of law regarding the length of detention.  The Supreme 
Court made clear in Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, that "in 
determining whether the seizure and search were 'unreasonable' 
our inquiry is a dual one--whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place."  Having decided the officers' actions here were 
not justified at their inception, we can abbreviate our analysis 
of the scope of the detention. 
 The district court held a reasonable officer would have 
believed the detention in this case was not excessive and that 
defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity 
regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment intrusion prior to 
the search of Karnes's car.  The court stated defendants followed 
a reasonable procedure to dispel their suspicion by employing the 
drug sniffing dog and that any additional delay was attributable 
to Karnes because he asked the troopers questions, argued with 
them, challenged their procedures, and insisted on explanations 
as to their actions. 
 We find the delay of nearly two and one-half hours 
sufficiently extreme when viewed in the light most favorable to 
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plaintiff that no reasonable officer would have believed the 
detention comported with constitutional requirements, and thus we 
hold that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on 
this issue as a matter of law.  The Supreme Court has held that 
"the brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests is an important factor in determining whether the 
seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on 
reasonable suspicion."  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 
(1983).  In Place, the Court held a ninety-minute delay before 
federal agents used a narcotics detection dog on Place's luggage, 
id. at 699, was sufficient "alone [to preclude] the conclusion 
that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable 
cause," id. at 709. 
 In contrast, we held in United States v. Frost, 999 
F.2d 737, 741-42 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 573 (1993), 
that an eighty-minute delay was acceptable.0  We distinguished 
Place on the grounds that the agents lacked diligence in pursuing 
the investigation while the police in Frost were delayed by the 
absence of a drug sniffing dog in the vicinity of the stop.  Id. 
When viewed in the light most favorable to Karnes, the delay here 
was approximately 150 minutes in length from the time Karnes was 
stopped until he was released, and was the result primarily of 
the defendants' dilatory pursuit of their investigation, not 
                     
0In combination, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) 
and United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1993), 
provide sufficient clarity in the law for us to hold that the law 
was clear for purposes of the first prong of the qualified 
immunity analysis. 
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plaintiff's questioning.  This length of time is excessive under 
the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances of this case.  
 It appears from the record (viewed in the light most 
favorable to Karnes) that defendants used much of the period 
between the arrival and use of the dog to attempt to cajole 
Karnes into granting them consent.  The fact that defendants did 
not accept Karnes's refusal to consent, in combination with their 
attempt to use his refusal as a factor in creating reasonable 
suspicion (see supra part I), shows a misunderstanding about the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  Karnes does not bear the 
burden of justifying his refusal to allow police to invade his 
privacy; it is rather the government official who must meet the 
constitutional requirements before he can encroach upon an 
individual's privacy.  The district court's grant of qualified 
immunity to defendants on the length of detention issue was 
improper.   
C. 
 Karnes also claims the search of the car was invalid 
because the police lacked probable cause.  The district court 
sent the case to the jury on the single factual issue of whether 
the narcotics dog had "alerted" to the smell of narcotics in 
Karnes's car.  Because the jury found it had, the district court 
granted qualified immunity to the defendants on the probable 
cause issue and entered a verdict in favor of the defendants.  We 
note that "[t]he automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
allows warrantless searches of any part of a vehicle that may 
conceal evidence . . . where there is probable cause to believe 
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that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime."  United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 343 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted).   
 Karnes contends the special interrogatory was improper 
because whether the drug dog "alerted" was not the only disputed 
question of fact on the existence of probable cause.  We 
disagree.  Notwithstanding the antecedent violations of the 
Fourth Amendment defendants may have committed, it is clear that 
the drug dog's alert would present probable cause for a search. 
See United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 1989) 
("[P]robable cause to arrest did not exist until the trained dog 
reacted affirmatively to the blue luggage . . . .").  
IV. 
 Our decision that defendants are not qualifiedly immune 
as a matter of law on the reasonable suspicion and length of 
detention issues makes it necessary to consider whether 
plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law should be 
granted.  On this point we must consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the defendants.0  Karnes is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law if, on the record before us, and 
taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
defendants, a reasonable jury could only find both that the 
defendants violated the Fourth Amendment and that they acted 
unreasonably in doing so.  The district court, of course, denied 
plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
A. 
                     
0The relevant facts are described above in parts I and III.A.2. 
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 We must determine whether a reasonable jury could 
decide that a police officer could have formed an objectively 
reasonable belief that the "vegetable matter" was marijuana. 
Absent the "vegetable matter," we would conclude that Skrutski 
and Kowalski lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Karnes.   
 The defendants do not need to demonstrate that the 
material was marijuana in order to receive a grant of qualified 
immunity.  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (observing 
qualified immunity protects officials who make "mere mistakes in 
judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law"). But 
they need to show their mistake was reasonable.  Pray v. City of 
Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, 1158 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Abdul-
Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 1993) (observing the 
Supreme Court has stated qualified immunity "provides ample 
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law") (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 
335, 341 (1986)).   
 As we have noted, in deciding whether a reasonable 
police officer could have believed there was marijuana in plain 
view in Karnes's car, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendants.  At trial, Skrutski testified as 
follows: 
 
Q [on examination by Karnes's attorney]: 
Let's talk a little bit about this green and 
brown vegetable matter.  This was on various 
spots -- over the floor of the car, isn't 
that right? 
 
A [Skrutski]: That's correct.   
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Q: And it was quite obvious as you looked in 
the window you could see it, isn't that true? 
 
A: It was -- it was there.  It was visible. I 
don't know how obvious it was, sir. 
 
Q: Would you please take a look at page 21 of 
your deposition Mr. Skrutski -- line 6. 
Question, "Well, are you saying you saw a 
couple of leaves or did you see it all over 
the interior of the car?" Answer, "It was in 
various spots on the vehicle floor." 
Question, "Quite obvious?" Answer, "Yes, it 
was."  
 
App. at 382-83. 
Q [on examination by Skrutski and Kowalski's 
attorney]: And there was some discussion in 
your testimony [earlier] about a green/brown 
vegetable matter.  Could you describe that? 
 
A [Skrutski]: It was -- a green/brown 
vegetable matter that was -- pulverized. 
There were very small pieces of it.  
 
Q: Based upon your training and experience, 
did you have any belief [at the time you were 
searching the bags Karnes consented to having 
you search] as to what it may have been? 
 
A: I suspected that it may have been 
marijuana.  
App. at 407.   
 Karnes's testimony presents a different picture of the 
appearance of this "vegetable matter": 
 
Q [on examination by Karnes's attorney]: 
Okay.  Let's talk about these leaves for a 
second.  Because there is some mention in the 
police report of a green brown vegetable 
matter in your car.  What was that exactly? 
 
A [Karnes]: . . . There wasn't just a little 
bit of leaves, there were leaves everywhere 
in there.  We've driven around all weekend 
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after doing this with the windows down in a 
state park.  And there were -- the only place 
in my car where there wasn't some of these 
leaves, was where I had been sitting in the 
seat.  They were up in the back dash.  They 
were all over the back seat.  They were in 
the floor.  They were in -- they were in the 
driver side floor.  Just my seat is the only 
place there was no leaves. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q: Okay.  And how large were these -- were 
these just all crumbled up residue of the 
leaves? 
 
A: They were all sizes from that big around 
(witness indicates) down to little tiny, tiny 
pieces. 
App. at 189-90. 
 We believe this contradictory testimony creates a 
genuine issue of material fact, and we cannot say that a 
reasonable jury could never believe Skrutski's description and 
credit only Karnes's.  The presence of drugs in plain view in an 
automobile creates probable cause to search, United States v. 
Burnett, 791 F.2d 64, 67 (6th Cir. 1986), and can support 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a further investigation.  While 
the troopers were mistaken about the presence of marijuana, on 
the basis of this record we cannot say their mistake was 
unreasonable as a matter of law.   
 A jury will have to weigh the defendants' contention 
that they believed the "vegetable matter" was marijuana against 
Karnes's assertion that not only could no one have thought that 
the leaves were marijuana but also that Kowalski expressly stated 
he knew the leaves were not marijuana.  See supra part III.A.2. A 
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jury could find that the defendants formed a reasonable belief 
that the leaves were marijuana, and such a finding would lead to 
a determination that the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity on the reasonable suspicion issue.0  See Pray, 49 F.3d 
at 1161 (observing that "many times the jury becomes the final 
arbiter of [defendants'] claim of immunity, since the legal 
question of immunity is completely dependent upon which view of 
the facts is accepted by the jury").0 
B.  
 Although it is not clear from Karnes's brief and notice 
of appeal whether he has appealed the district court's denial of 
his motion for judgment as a matter of law on the length of 
detention issue, we need not decide whether the issue is properly 
before us because we would affirm the district court on this 
                     
0Judge Becker dissents on this one issue.  Noting that it is 
uncontradicted that the material in the car was in fact autumn 
leaves, he does not believe that a jury could find that the 
defendants formed a reasonable belief that the leaves were 
marijuana.  Judge Becker would therefore grant the plaintiff's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law and remand only for trial 
on damages. 
0We are reminded that the qualified immunity defense is designed 
in part to avoid chilling appropriate police behavior. As the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted in Gooden v. Howard 
County, Md., 954 F.2d 960, 967 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc): 
 
If every mistaken seizure were to subject 
police officers to personal liability under 
§1983, those same officers would come to 
realize that the safe and cautious course was 
always to take no action.  The purposes of 
immunity are not served by a police force 
intent on escaping liability to the 
cumulative detriment of those duties which 
communities depend upon such officers to 
perform. 
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point.  At issue is whether a reasonable jury could decide that 
the police diligently pursued their investigation, thereby making 
the length of the detention acceptable.   
 There is no direct testimony to rebut Karnes's 
contention that the search occurred at 7:00 p.m. and that he was 
released at 7:30 p.m.  A reasonable jury could not find that the 
length of detention was less than 150 minutes.  Defendants 
produce only weak evidence to justify either the 90-minute delay 
between the arrival of the canine unit and its use or the nearly 
two and one-half hour total delay.  Defendants contend Karnes was 
so argumentative they were forced into a lengthy explanation of 
their procedure.0  Even though the length of detention may have 
been constitutionally excessive notwithstanding defendants' 
explanation, a reasonable jury could find that defendants were 
reasonable in their belief that the delay comported with 
constitutional requirements.  Accordingly, this is a jury 
                     
0Trooper Kowalski explained the length of the delay: 
 
Mr. Karnes was so argumentative, I really 
didn't want to push the issue into a physical 
confrontation.  I felt it was best, the 
position that we were in along the highway 
. . . .  Even though there were two of us 
there--being that close to the highway, 
having to work a [sic] with the dog, having 
the left hand tied up with a lead, and then 
having to worry about my firearm, which was 
on my right side . . . . 
 
 And I really didn't want him to have any 
ill feelings about the state police.  I 
wanted him to understand what was going on. 
 
App. at 542.  
35 
question, and the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion 
for judgment as a matter of law on this point was not in error. 
V. 
 Karnes also contends the district court erred by 
admitting evidence at trial of his 1985 arrest for allegedly 
assaulting his sister and verbally resisting arrest without 
violence.  The court admitted this evidence under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) to refute Karnes's contention that he suffered 
damage from defendants' actions.  We review the district court's 
admission of evidence of prior bad acts under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 389 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821 (1989).   
 Defendants argue the evidence was properly admitted 
after Karnes testified that the incident in this case diminished 
his respect for the police and thus caused him damage.  After 
applying the balancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the 
district court gave a limiting instruction, admonishing the jury 
to consider the evidence only for the purpose of determining 
damages. 
 We have held that evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 
404(b) can be admitted when the evidence is probative of a 
material issue other than character.  Traitz, 871 F.2d at 389. We 
see no abuse of discretion here. 
VI. 
 On the issues of reasonable suspicion and length of 
detention we will reverse the district court's grant of 
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.  We will 
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affirm the remainder of the district court's decisions.  We will 
remand the case to the district court for it to allow the jury to 
make a determination of the reasonable suspicion and length of 
detention issues and for an assessment of damages as appropriate. 
